Option-based Equity Risk Premiums by Lewis, Alan L.
ar
X
iv
:1
91
0.
14
52
2v
1 
 [q
-fi
n.C
P]
  3
1 O
ct 
20
19
Option-based Equity Risk Premiums
Alan L. Lewis∗
November 1, 2019
Abstract
We construct the term structure of the (forward-looking, US market) equity risk premium
from SPX option chains. The method is “model-light”. Risk-neutral probability densities
are estimated by fitting N-component Gaussian mixture models to option quotes, where
N is a small integer (here 4 or 5). These densities are transformed to their real-world
equivalents by exponential tilting with a single parameter: the Coefficient of Relative Risk
Aversion κ. From history, I estimate κ = 3 ± 0.5. From the inferred real-world densities,
the equity risk premium is readily calculated. Three term structures serve as examples.
1 Introduction and summary
The equity risk premium (ERP throughout) has frequently been called the most important
number in finance. To be fair, so have LIBOR and the 10-year US Treasury yield. It’s certainly
the elusive one: interest rates are readily observed, while the ERP (as defined here) is a forward-
looking “market” expectation, requiring estimation.
US market history suggests a long-run (unconditional) ERP of 4-6% per year. Our topic is the
difficult problem of estimating time variation and term structure effects. Plausibly, key drivers
of this conditional ERP are outlooks for inflation, rates and yields, earnings, and volatility.
There are many approaches: (Duarte & Rosa, 2105) review 20 models. An interesting and
diverse collection of views is found in (Hammond, Leibowitz, & Siegel, 2011).
Many authors use time series models to infer an ERP from the (weak) predictive power of
financial ratios: dividend yields or PE ratios. However, there is controversy over the predictive
power. Even without the controversy, a difficulty is that financial ratios don’t vary much in
the short-term. Another difficulty: beyond key drivers is the large and nebulous set It, the
time t “state-of-the-world” – any element of which may become (momentarily) important to the
market’s outlook. For example, at this writing, trade negotiations have become a market focus.
Here, we develop a new approach, using SPX options and a one-parameter change-of-measure
to estimate the ERP term structure at arbitrary trade dates. It’s relatively objective, driven
largely by forward-looking market data: option quotes.
While certainly not “model-free”, I call it “model-light”. No stochastic process is adopted for
SPX. No financial ratios are singled out as explicit drivers of the ERP, although they can certainly
play an implicit role in market expectations. Indeed, anything the market deems momentarily
important to its outlook, as long as it’s reflected in the options market, can influence our ERP
estimates. Our key modelling assumption – which has theoretical and historical support – is
that an exponential change-of-measure transforms the option-based risk-neutral density (RND)
to the real-world density (RWD).
Figs. 2-4 show three examples of our new ERP term structure estimates. Near expirations
are closely spaced in time, and made more visible with log time scales. The trade dates shown
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have relatively high, low, and middle-of-the-road (recent) volatility environments, as measured
by the VIX index: see Fig.1. In the higher volatility environment, the ERP estimates decay
from a large value ≈ 26% (from 2-day options) toward the longer-run averages (from 2.5 year
options). Conversely, in the lower volatility environment, the ERP term structure is increasing
with the term, again toward unconditional values. Finally, the last volatility environment yields
a relatively flat term structure. Qualitatively, those are plausible term structure behaviors, key
drivers here being volatility and risk-aversion. The decay from 26% is just a recent example.
More generally, volatility and the short-term (annualized) ERP estimates can be expected to be
very high in systematically stressed markets – let’s say with VIX above 40 – as was seen in the
Financial Crisis of 2007-2008.
The figure ERP bands use a Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion, κ, in the range 2.5− 3.5,
with κ = 3.0 being the central estimate (central curve). We argue for that range in Sec. 2,
using market history. Note that κ also serves as the parameter for the exponential change-
of-measure. Theoretically, the exponential form follows from a standard equilibrium market-
clearing argument using a representative investor with power utility – an argument reviewed in
the Appendix. To estimate κ, we use the fact that it is the exponential tilt parameter that turns
a (long-run historical) excess return sequence into a zero-mean sequence: see eqn (12) below.
Looking forward with options data (in Sec. 4), we estimate RND’s by fitting SPX option quotes
to Gaussian mixture models. Then, κ effects a one-parameter change of measure from the RND’s
to RWD’s, the real-world probability densities. Examples are shown in Figs. 10-12. Given the
RWD’s, the ERP’s are readily calculated. That’s the paper in a nutshell.
For the remainder of this section, I give a more elaborated summary. Key formulas are boxed.
1.1 Some definitions and notations
What exactly do we mean by the ERP? There are many closely related definitions. First of
all, we adopt a US perspective, so “equities” means a broad-based (capitalization weighted)
measure of the entire US equity market, frequently proxied by the S&P 500 Index. Second, the
ERP is far from a single number. Like interest rates, it’s time-varying, with a time-varying term
structure. With Et denoting a (real-world) expectation conditional on date-t information It –
broadly speaking: the “state of the world” – we define:
ERPt,T = Et
[
Ret,T
]−Rft,T = Et [Ret,T −Rft,T ] , where at time t : (1)
• Ret,T is a future random total return on the equity market from t to T , and
• Rft,T is a time-t observable risk-free return (using US Treasury instruments).
Returns in (1) are simple total returns: Ret,T = (S¯T − S¯t)/S¯t, where S¯ is a total-return index
incorporating reinvested dividends. (Without a bar, St is the price series without dividends).
Call Ret,T −Rft,T the excess total return. Like interest rates, we’ll always give estimated ERP’s on
an annualized percentage basis. For those, we multiply the ERP calculated from (1) by 100×fann,
where the annualization factor fann = 1/(T − t), with time measured in years. That convention
is used in Figs. 2-4 and associated tables.
Let’s call Rft,T the risk-free basis for the ERP. There are two natural choices in the literature
for the risk-free basis. One choice ignores the T and use a short-maturity US Treasury bill
return for each basis. The second choice, which we employ, uses the time-t return available from
Treasury instruments that mature at T . That’s more natural for our forward-looking, option-
based estimates, and is used in Figs. 2-4. For our history-based estimates of κ, Rft,T is a realized
return. Those are constructed from monthly Tbill returns (when T − t is one month), chaining
together monthly returns (when T − t is greater than a month), or pro-rating monthly returns
(when T − t is one day).
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Table 1: Some methods for estimating the RND
Reference Description
(Bliss & Panigirtzoglou, 2004) Smoothing spline fit to mid-quote IV’s + flat (Gaussian) extensions
(Gatheral & Jacquier, 2013) 5-parameter SVI fit to mid-quote IV’s implies a full RND
(Fengler, 2005) Smoothing spline fit to option prices implies a partial RND
(Figlewski, 2010) Weighted spline fit to mid-quote IV’s + GEV distribution extensions
(Malz, 2014) Interpolating spline fit to mid-quote IV’s + flat (Gaussian) extensions
1.2 Estimating risk-neutral and real-world probability densities
Let Qt,T (ST ), denote the time-t RND for ST , where ST is the terminal index price. The RND
depends upon St, the starting index price, and generally It, our catch-all for information known
at t. These latter dependencies are freely suppressed, but implied by the t subscript in Qt,T (ST ).
From Treasury rates, infer deterministic risk-free discount factors Dt,T := 1/(1 + R
f
t,T ) =
exp{−rt,T (T − t)}, using various of our notations. Then, where K is the option strike price, call
option values Ct,T (K) are given by
Ct,T (K) = Dt,T E
Q
t
[
(ST −K)+
]
= Dt,T
∫ ∞
0
(ST −K)+Qt,T (ST ) dST , (2)
where EQt [· · · ] := EQ [· · · |It]. Given a set of option prices, {Ct,T (Ki) : i = 1..Nopts}, there are
various types of approaches to estimating Qt,T (ST ):
(1) Modelling the underlying stock process.
(2) Fitting approaches suggested by the Breeden-Litzenberger relation.
(3) Direct modelling of the Q-density Qt,T (ST ) or (as here) the pdf for logST .
Type 1. A typical framework is the following. Postulate a (continuous-time) Q-measure jump-
diffusion process, dSt/St = (rt − δt) dt + σt dWt + dJt, where σt is a parametrized stochastic
volatility process and Jt is a parametrized (zero-mean) jump process. Free parameters are
estimated by fits to option prices, implied volatilities, or similar targets. Parameters estimates
yield Qt,T (ST )’s.
The main problem is that stationary models will have, let’s say, 6-12 parameters for com-
putational tractability. Unfortunately, such a small number will prove wholly inadequate for
fitting a large option data set with multiple trade dates. One could adopt (large) parameter sets
that vary with the trade date t and option expiration T , but this does not typically result in a
logically consistent stochastic process. For example, why should the putative underlying process
even know about the arbitrary dates of option expirations?
Type 2. If calls were marketed with a continuum of strikes K ∈ (0,∞), and zero bid-ask
spreads, then the Breeden-Litzenberger relation,
Qt,T (K) =
1
D(t, T )
d2Ct,T (K)
dK2
, (3)
would yield a unique, completely “model-free” risk-neutral density. Then, given discrete strikes
and positive spreads, use interpolating or smoothing splines to fit option prices or implied volatil-
ities (IV’s for short). Generally, it’s better to fit the {IV (Ki)}, which yields a smooth function
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IV (K). From that, a smooth option pricing function Ct,T (K) = cBS(K, IV (K)) is available,
where cBS(K,σ) is the Black-Scholes formula, suppressing other arguments. Finally, (3) and the
chain rule for differentiation yield the estimated Qt,T (K).
In my opinion, the main issue with this type of approach is deciding how to extrapolate the
{IV (Ki)} to the ranges 0 < K < Kmin and Kmax < K <∞. Here (Kmin,Kmax) represent the
range of marketable strikes. You must extrapolate to find a proper (norm=1) RND. It’s difficult
to devise an extrapolation method that doesn’t feel ad hoc. Some references for this type of
approach are given in Table 1.
Type 3. Here, one parameterizes directly the RND. After some experimentation with type
2 methods, I ultimately adopted a type 3 method. Specifically, with log price-returns XT =
log(ST /St), the corresponding RND is qXT (x) = Qt,T (Ste
x)Ste
x. Then, I fit a Gaussian Mixture
Model (GMM) to option quotes.1 The mixture consists of N Gaussians:
log price-returns : qXT (x) = qt,T (x) =
N∑
i=1
wi
e−(x−µiτ)
2/(2σ2i τ)√
2πσ2i τ
, (4)
where τ = T − t, and N is a small integer (4-5 in my fits).
(Notations: strictly, I should write Xt,T instead of XT , but I don’t for notational simplicity.
Also, I move to small letters for log-arguments).
The fitted parameters are N positive weights, {wi}, and 2N drifts and volatilities, {µi, σi}.
After a normalization and martingale condition, this leaves 3N−2 free parameters at each (t, T )
pair associated to a trade date and an option expiration. Using (2) and the corresponding put
value formula, free parameters are adjusted to fit option quotes – details are found in Sec. 4.2.
Under an exponential change of measure, (6) below, the RWD will also have Gaussian tails.
At first glance, this might give pause because it’s well-known that single Gaussian fits to historical
S&P 500 returns are strongly rejected by statistical tests. However, we stress this rejection is
irrelevant to fits of mixtures. To see why, consider the analogous RND case. A single Gaussian
implies flat IV smiles, a shape which would lead similarly to strong rejection of the proposed
density. In contrast, a GMM can nicely fit market smiles, as we will show.
Indeed, as I suggest in footnote 1, in my opinion the GMM method is a ‘natural’ for the ERP
problem, at least as set up here. Let me summarize some of the attractive features.
First, the GMM is able to achieve good fits to option quotes.
Second, by modelling a density directly, smile extrapolation is built-in and does not need to
be grafted on – as is the case with spline fits to IV’s.
Third, the GMM accommodates arbitrary κ in the exponential change of measure. A plausible
alternative might choose qt,T (x) from a class of models with exponential (‘semi-heavy’) tails. For
example (although it is actually a type 2 method), J. Gatheral’s SVI method has exponential
tails (Gatheral & Jacquier, 2013). That’s fine, but there will be a restriction on κ relative to the
tail parameters, so that the denominators in (6) below exist. This restriction is certainly not a
deal breaker for semi-heavy tails, but adds a complication if you insist on them.
Finally, option values and exponential changes of measure are nicely tractable under GMM.
1 My thanks to Thijs van den Berg, who suggested exploring GMM’s. Prior to that suggestion, I was fitting
smoothing splines to IV’s (similar to some Table 1 methods) and attempting extrapolation. But I quickly
converted to the GMM approach described here: it seemed a ‘natural’ for my ERP problem setup.
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Transforming to log total-return densities. The cost of carry parameters are (rt,T , δt,T ).
How we get them is explained later. Here rt,T is the continuously compounded risk-free interest
rate and δt,T is a continuously compounded dividend yield for the underlying stock index. Given
those, we have the index forward price
Ft,T = St exp{(rt,T − δt,T )(T − t)}.
If the dividends were reinvested into the index, the index would be different: call it S¯. With that
one, the forward would be Ft,T = S¯t exp{(rt,T )(T − t)}. Given our original price index price ST ,
this motivates us to associate a random total-return index S¯T := ST e
δt,T (T−t) which incorporates
hypothetically reinvested dividends. The associated log total-return is X¯T = log(S¯T /S¯t) =
XT + δt,T (T − t), and the associated risk-neutral density is found by a simple translation:
log total-returns : qX¯T (x) = qXT (x− δt,T (T − t)) . (5)
Transforming to the real-world probability density. Finally, we move from risk-neutral
(Q-measure) densities to real-world (P-measure) densities using the exponential tilt associated to
a risk-averse representative agent model. The agent, with time-t wealthWt, chooses investments
with payoffs at T > t by maximizing her expected utility U¯t,T (Wt) = c
T−t Et
[
(WT /Wt)
(1−κ)
]
,
Here c is a time preference parameter that need not be estimated, and κ ≥ 0 is the agent’s
Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). To clear the market, all the agent’s wealth must
be optimally invested in the aggregate securities market; thus WT = S¯T , the total return equity
index from above. While this utility model is well-known in spirit, there are many variations:
our version is given in the Appendix. Using total return pdf’s, it leads to the P⇔ Q duality:
qX¯T (x) =
e−κx pX¯T (x)∫
e−κxpX¯T (x) dx
⇔ pX¯T (x) =
eκx qX¯T (x)∫
eκxqX¯T (x) dx
. (6)
1.3 Calculating the ERP
Equation (1) uses RWD’s; specifically, the P-total-return densities. With (6), we have
ERPt,T =
∫
e(1+κ)x qX¯T (x) dx∫
eκx qX¯T (x) dx
− (1 +Rft,T ). (7)
Use (4),(5) and some routine calculations to evaluate (7). The result for the option-based ERP
is relatively simple – on an annualized percent basis:
ERP
(ann%)
t,T (κ) =
100
T − t ×
{(
eδt,T τ
N∑
i=1
w˜i e
αi+(κ+
1
2
)vi
)
− ert,T τ
}
,
using τ = T − t, αi = µiτ, vi = σ2i τ,
γi = καi +
1
2κ
2vi, and w˜i = wie
γi/
N∑
i=1
wie
γi .
(8)
Here the {wi, µi, σi} are the GMM fits to option quotes at t for expiration T .
This concludes our summary.
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2 Estimation of the CRRA parameter κ
There is a large literature on this topic. A classic study is (Friend & Blume, 1975) who concluded
(adapting to our notation):
The empirical results ... indicate that the assumption of constant proportional risk
aversion for households is a fairly accurate description of the marketplace ... The
implication is that κ for the typical household is in excess of 1.0 – contrary to the
proportion of the log utility function. Since the market price of risk is probably
around 2.0 or more, κ is more likely to be in excess of two.
Unfortunately, the subsequent literature muddied up this relatively clean picture.2 Our approach
is straightforward and agreeable with Friend & Blume: we estimate κˆ = 3± 0.5. At the end of
this section, we compare with the study mentioned in footnote 2.
We begin with the martingale relations.
Martingale relations. In a risk-neutral world, the ERP is zero and (1) reads
EQt
[
Ret,T −Rft,T
]
= 0 (9)
for all (t, T ) pairs. Recall 1 + Ret,T = S¯T /S¯t, where S¯t is a total-return index (i.e., including
reinvested dividends). Thus, (9) has the well-known equivalent:
S¯t =
1
1 +Rft,T
EQt
[
S¯T
]
. (10)
Recall 1/(1 + Rft,T ) = Dt,T in our previous notation. Thus, (10) says the discounted (total-
return) index behaves like a martingale under the risk-neutral measure – the starting point for
many dynamical stochastic process models. This justifies calling either (9) or (10) ‘martingale
relations’.
The estimator. To estimate κ, consider Ret,T where T − t is, for example, one-month. Then
employ (9) on an unconditional basis using a long series of historical one-month equity total
returns. That is, first write (9) as∫
e−κxt(Ret −Rft ) p(xt) dxt = 0. (11)
Here Ret = e
xt − 1 and p(xt) is the unconditional density for xt, the month-t log-total-return
of the equity aggregate. The Rft are then the monthly Tbill returns. Next, estimate p(xt)
from the empirical density using {xi = xt(i) : i = 1, · · · ,M} a list of M monthly historical
returns from (let’s say) 1926 to date. (We consider other periods also). The empirical density
is p(x) = 1M
∑M
i=1 δ(x− xi), using the Dirac delta. Upon substitution in (11): κ is estimated by
κˆ, the solution to
f(κˆ) = 0, where f(κ) =
M∑
i=1
e−κxi(exi − 1−Rfi ). (12)
In other words, κˆ is the exponential tilt parameter that turns the historical equity excess return
sequence into a zero-mean sequence. This is ‘dynamics-free’: no specific stochastic process is
imposed upon the sequence. Of course, our approach relies upon the assumption that this
exponential change of measure is indeed used by the market (or the representative agent if you
like). Given the need to either impose dynamics or impose a preference model, the latter choice
is the minimal (“model-light”) one.
2 For example, (Bliss & Panigirtzoglou, 2004) present (their Table VII) literature estimates from eleven studies
with κ estimates ranging from 0-55.
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2.1 Data sources for historical equity returns
I use two equity indices as proxies for the aggregate U.S. equity market:
(i) The S&P 500/Composite Index (SBBI);
(ii) All US exchange-listed stocks (Fama and French online data from CRSP)
Some additional detail:
S&P 500 Index. The S&P 500 Index has modern form (close to 500 stocks) starting March 4,
1957. However, this series is commonly joined with the earlier “S&P Composite” (90 large U.S.
stocks), extending back to 1926 and still called the S&P 500. Our main source for the joined series
was the “SBBI Yearbook: Stocks, Bonds, Bills, and Inflation” (Ibbotson & Duff & Phelps, 2016).
I used SBBI data for monthly total returns through calendar year 2017 and updated the results
myself through June 2019. For the update (capital appreciation), I used Mathematica’s built-in
curated data (FinancialData["SP500"]). To update the dividend income returns, I used the
“S&P 500 Dividend Points Index (SPXDIV)”, available online at https://us.spindices.com/
indices/equity/sp-500-dividend-points-index-quarterly. There was excellent agreement
among these various sources where they overlapped.
Fama and French data. While SBBI data is monthly, Kenneth French provides (and updates
online) a daily series used by him and Eugene Fama in their research. (FF data for short).
Specifically, they provide Ret −Rft a capitalization weighted, daily excess return on the ‘market’,
represented by “all CRSP firms incorporated in the US and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or
NASDAQ that have a CRSP share code of 10 or 11”. CRSP is the Center for Research in
Security Prices, part of the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. The Ken
French data library and further details may be found at https://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html. The risk-free rate Rft is described as the
“Treasury bill rate (from Ibbotson Associates)”, likely the SBBI series prorated to daily returns.
2.2 S&P500 results
Table 2 shows the κˆ estimates from the monthly SBBI series using various start dates through
June 2019. Also shown are various moments of the true series and the inferred risk-neutral
distribution (from tilting at the estimated κˆ). Recall the ‘excess returns’ are the (annualized)
Ret −Rft series; those have zero Q-means by construction. Higher moments shown are computed
from log-returns: log(1 +Ret ).
Why those starting dates? Jan 1926 starts the entire series. Jan 1950 roughly starts the
post-WWII period, often considered a structural break to a world of reduced average volatility
and less frequent recessions. Recall Apr 1957 marks the start of the ‘true’ S&P 500 Index.
Finally, Jan 1987 and Jan 1988 are convenient starts to show both pre- and post- Oct 19, 1987
data, as the Black Monday market crash is often considered an outlier.
As one sees from Table 2, κˆ estimates all lie within a range of 2− 4. Post-WWII κ estimates
tend to be higher than the entire series. Those are the results from that table important for the
ERP.3
2.3 Temporal aggregation of the S&P500 data
Strictly speaking, the stock market never offers a stationary ‘return generating process’, in the
sense of a well-specified casino game. Nevertheless, if the risk-aversion model is not too far off the
3Some incidental observations. The risk-neutral standard deviations are always larger than the true values
– by amounts ranging from roughly 1 to 1.5 vol points (annualized percentage points). Risk-neutral skewness’s
are uniformly more negative than real-world. Kurtoses are smaller post-WWII and have similar risk-neutral and
real-world values for every start date.
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Table 2: S&P 500: CRRA κˆ estimates and associated statistics.
Various start dates through June 2019. Monthly observations. Means and Std Dev’s are an-
nualized and in percent. For example, ‘Mean excess returns’ are 12 × 100× (avg monthly
total returns less monthly Tbill returns). Standard deviations, skewness, and kurtosis are based
upon continuously compounded total returns (log-returns). ‘True’ = actual: realized. ‘RN’=
risk-neutral: the exponentially-tilted empirical Q-distribution with tilt parameter κˆ.
Mean
Start Excess Return Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
month Nobs κˆ True RN True RN True RN True RN
Jan 1926 1122 2.28 8.14 0 18.6 19.7 -0.50 -1.29 11.0 10.4
Jan 1950 834 3.58 7.73 0 14.3 15.2 -0.67 -0.95 5.5 6.3
Apr 1957 747 2.96 6.52 0 14.5 15.3 -0.69 -0.93 5.6 6.2
Jan 1987 390 3.33 8.04 0 15.0 16.5 -1.09 -1.36 6.7 7.4
Jan 1988 378 3.83 8.15 0 14.2 15.2 -0.78 -0.90 4.7 4.8
Table 3: S&P 500: CRRA κˆ estimates Jan 1926 – June 2019.
Various observation frequencies with means and std devs annualized.
Mean
Data Over- Excess Returns Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
frequency lap? Nobs κˆ True RN True RN True RN True RN
monthly no 1122 2.28 8.14 0 18.6 19.7 -0.50 -1.29 11.0 10.4
quarterly no 374 1.97 8.66 0 20.6 21.9 0.06 -1.05 10.9 7.5
quarterly yes 1120 2.10 8.39 0 19.4 21.5 -0.35 -1.43 11.0 8.7
6-months no 187 1.95 8.55 0 19.8 23.5 -0.91 -1.33 6.8 5.9
6-months yes 1117 2.05 8.47 0 19.2 22.9 -0.92 -1.33 6.7 6.0
yearly yes 1111 1.82 8.89 0 20.1 26.7 -1.08 -1.49 6.9 6.2
mark, given long ‘pseudo-stationary’ samples, one would expect similar κˆ estimates regardless of
the return observation frequency: daily, monthly, quarterly, and so on. Given our monthly S&P
500 total returns, we aggregate the data into longer periods and repeat the estimating procedure.
Results. In Table 3 we show the effect of this temporal aggregation, using the longest SBBI
data period: Jan 1926 – June 2019. When aggregating, there are two choices: overlapping or
non-overlapping periods. We show both choices – with the exception of yearly. That’s because,
except for years, the non-overlapping data still end exactly on June 30, 2019. Note: we also call
the data frequency length the ‘horizon length’.
As one sees, the κˆ estimates are not very sensitive to aggregation: that’s evidence in favor
of the risk-adjustment model. However, there is a small tendency for κˆ to decrease with the
horizon length.4
4More incidental observations on Table 3. True standard deviations are seen fairly constant under aggregation,
but risk-neutral standard deviations are growing with the aggregation horizon. This is consistent with a term
structure to volatility risk premiums, which also tends to increase with horizon length. For example, there is an
unconditional term structure to VIX’s which has a similar increase with horizon lengths. Risk-neutral skewness
seem fairly stable with the horizon length. Both the true and risk-neutral kurtosis are seen decreasing with the
horizon length.
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Table 4: FF data: CRRA κˆ estimates and associated statistics.
Data: all US-incorporated stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ exchanges. Various
start dates through Apr 30, 2019. Means and Std Dev’s are annualized and in percent. Daily
mean excess returns are 252 × 100× (avg daily total returns less Tbill returns). Standard
deviations, skewness, and kurtosis are based upon continuously compounded total returns (log-
returns). ‘RN’= Risk-neutral: the exponentially-tilted empirical Q-distribution.
I. Daily Mean
Excess Returns Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Start Nobs κˆ True RN True RN True RN True RN
Jul 1, 1926 24473 2.58 7.40 0 16.9 17.0 -0.43 -0.92 20.5 22.5
Jan 1, 1950 17530 3.48 7.68 0 14.8 15.1 -0.84 -1.52 22.5 30.3
Apr 1, 1957 15627 2.85 6.69 0 15.3 15.5 -0.80 -1.34 21.8 27.8
Jan 1, 1987 8147 2.67 8.49 0 17.7 18.1 -0.95 -1.52 21.6 26.8
Jan 1, 1988 7894 2.93 8.75 0 17.2 17.4 -0.35 -0.61 11.4 11.5
II. Monthly Mean
Excess Returns Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Start Nobs κˆ True RN True RN True RN True RN
Jul 1, 1926 1114 2.27 7.96 0 18.4 19.5 -0.56 -1.23 9.9 9.6
Jan 1, 1950 832 3.39 7.73 0 14.7 15.7 -0.77 -1.06 5.8 6.6
Apr 1, 1957 745 2.83 6.68 0 15.0 15.9 -0.78 -1.01 5.7 6.4
Jan 1, 1987 388 3.19 8.11 0 15.4 17.0 -1.21 -1.48 7.2 7.9
Jan 1, 1988 376 3.72 8.34 0 14.6 15.7 -0.87 -0.97 4.8 4.9
2.4 Fama and French data results
To enable a direct comparison with SBBI monthlies, we also show FF monthlies. All FF series
begin on July 1, 1926 and, as of this writing, have been updated through April 30, 2019. We
repeat the analysis from Table 2 with results now found in Table 4.
Results. For Panel I(FF Daily), the κˆ estimates are broadly consistent with Table 2; however,
they now have a narrower range: 2.5 - 3.5. For Panel II (FF Monthly), the κˆ estimates are quite
close to Table 2 (SBBI/S&P 500) with a range 2.3 - 3.7.5
5Incidental observations on the FF results. Re Panel I: the RN standard deviations are now only slightly
larger than the true ones. Given now daily observations, this is additional evidence of a monotonically increasing
term structure for the (annualized) unconditional risk-neutral volatility σQ(τ), associated to returns with horizon
length τ . Recall the discussion for Table 3. The daily return RN skewness are found in the range -0.6 to -1.5.
Daily kurtoses are, unsurprisingly, now much larger than seen in Table 3 for periods containing the Oct 1987
crash. RN kurtoses tend to be larger than the real-world. All kurtoses fall significantly post-crash.
Re Panel II: As with the SBBI monthlies, the RN standard deviations are now about 1-1.5 vol points (1-1.5%)
larger than the true ones. Again, this is a term structure effect. The monthly return RN skewness are found in
the range -1 to -1.5. The kurtosis pattern is similar to Table 2.
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2.5 Summary and contrast with related literature
In summary, based upon both the SBBI and FF results, we adopt the central estimate κˆ = 3,
with a confidence range of 2.5− 3.5 for US equities.
An interesting and related study is (Bliss & Panigirtzoglou, 2004). Among other things, the
authors use a similar power utility model to transform an estimated risk-neutral density from
S&P 500 (futures) options to a real-world density. With different data and methods than ours,
they argue for a horizon-dependent coefficient of relative risk aversion: κ(τ) (in our notation)
where τ = T − t. They estimate κˆ(τ) for various horizons by maximizing the forecast ability of
the corresponding inferred real-world densities over 1983-2001. Their estimates show a significant
horizon effect: declining from κˆ ∼ 8 at a one-week horizon to κˆ ∼ 2 at a 6-week horizon, their
upper limit (Table V in their paper).
In contrast, our evidence supports a reasonably constant κ with a smaller horizon dependence.
We investigated the effect of temporal aggregation (the horizon length) on our estimates. And
recall we indeed found a tendency for κˆ to decline with the horizon; however, the horizon effects
we saw were much smaller and sometimes in the opposite direction: recall Table 3 (S&P 500) and
Table 4 (CRSP all US equity). In general, the horizon differences we saw should be considered
subsumed by our overall estimated uncertainty: a ‘true’ κ lying somewhere in 2.5-3.5.
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3 Option data and handling
I acquired end-of-day SPX option data for all Wednesdays from Jan 2018 through June 2019
from the CBOEs LiveVol service: “End-of-Day Option Quotes with Calcs”. These Wednesdays
are the ‘trade dates’. Actually ‘end-of-day’ is a slight misnomer: the files record option quotes
and CBOE-calculated option implied volatilities (IVs) at 15:45 New York time. This time is
15 minutes prior to the regular stock and option market session close in NYC and Chicago.
According to the CBOE:
“Implied volatility and Greeks are calculated off the 1545 time-stamp, considered a
more accurate snapshot of market liquidity than the end of day market”.
I selected three trade dates for analysis, hopefully reported here in enough detail to encourage
replication studies:
(i) Feb 7, 2018: a relatively high volatility environment, two days after the ‘Volpocalyspse’.6
(ii) Aug 8, 2018, the date of a local low in VIX.
(iii) June 26, 2019, last date of my data set, with VIX in the mid-teens.
The motivation was to compare ERP term structures in relatively high, low, and middling
volatility environments as measured by VIX: see Fig. 1.
3.1 Preprocessing
The raw CBOE files come one per trade date. For a given trade date, they first needed to be
sorted into separate files for each root symbol and expiration. Also, cost-of-carry parameters for
each expiration need to be identified. These two tasks form the preprocessing step.
S&P 500 index options are cash-settled, European-style, options of two types:
• “AM” options with root SPX, and
• “PM” options (Weeklys) with root SPXW.
SPX (am) options were the first to be introduced and expire on traditional third Fridays of each
month. They cash settle based upon a special SPX quotation computed at the opening of the
expiration trading day. SPXW (pm) options expire on a variety of weekdays (including those
third Fridays); they cash settle based upon the end-of-day closing SPX index value (4:00pm New
York time). This is the current root symbology and applies to the data used in this article.
(Prior to May 2017, the S&P 500 root symbology was somewhat different).
As it turned out, this first sorting resulted in 42 separate expirations for each of the three trade
dates analyzed. For example, see the first two columns of Tables 6 and 7 for the roots and
expirations for the Feb 7, 2018 and Aug 8, 2018 trade dates.
6The Feb 5, 2018 volatility event, more amusingly the ‘Volpocalypse’, is quite interesting in its own right. On
that day the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost 1175 points, its worst point decline ever. However, the percentage
loss was only 4.6%, certainly not a crash, and SPX only lost 4.1%. Given only those facts, one might guess that
VIX would rise about 20% – again nothing to write home about. Instead, VIX rose almost 100%, triggering a
‘termination event’ in a popular exchange-traded fund (ticker XIV). This (short) volatility product, by design,
maintained a short position in VIX futures: about $1.5 billion worth going into the session (NAV/share ≈ $100).
Of course, if you are short $X in a collateralized future, and the future rises 100%, you will lose your $X. Indeed,
XIV ended the day with an NAV around $60 million (NAV/share = $4.22), losing about 95%. As provided by
its prospectus, under any daily loss exceeding 80%, the sponsor (Credit Suisse) could, if it so chose, close the
product: the fund was indeed closed.
While the fund worked ‘correctly’ (i.e., as described in its prospectus), investors were correct to be surprised
by VIX doubling under a 4% one-day loss in the SPX. I am reminded of a famous dictum from physicist Murray
Gell-Mann, recently deceased: “everything that is not forbidden is mandatory”.
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3.1.1 Cost of carry: the VIX white paper method
There are various ways to estimate (r, δ). For the data shown here, we used the “VIX white
paper method”.7 In this method, the riskless rate rt,T is taken to be a US Treasury yield for the
same maturity T . More specifically, starting from the Daily Treasury Yield Curve rates available
for each trade date at the US Treasury’s web site, one can interpolate a value for rt,T . Next, one
determine the forward SPX level, F , by identifying the strike price K∗ at which the absolute
difference between the call and put prices, (C,P ), (using the bid-ask quote average) is smallest.
From those, an option-implied forward price, F = K∗+e
rt,T (T−t)(C −P ), is calculated. Finally,
writing F = Ft,T = St e
(rt,T−δt,T )(T−t), where St is the 15:45 trade date index value, one infers
a value for the dividend yield δt,T .
While the VIX white paper method is attractive, it may not be the best estimator of what option
market makers are actually experiencing for rates and yields. For example, for option maturities
greater than 3 months, it tends to produce dividend yields that are low relative to projections
based upon historical dividends. The reason for that may be that the US Treasury rate (even
though a ‘term’ rate) is low relative to the typical funding/investing rates that are paid/received
by market makers and other professional traders. To clarify the issue, a second cost-of-carry
method was considered, using a regression based upon put-call parity. While that alternative
method indeed resulted in higher (r, δ)’s, the option-implied forward prices were quite close. As
a result, the ERP estimates were also quite close under the two methods. Details are found in
Sec. 7.
7https://www.cboe.com/micro/vix/vixwhite.pdf
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4 The GMM: option values and fitting
4.1 Option values
At each trade date t, there are typically 50-300 options expiring at each expiration T . Each of
these options has a trade time 15:45 bid (which may be zero) and an ask. The mid-quote is the
average of the bid and ask; we fit mid-quotes for out-of-the-money options: puts for K < St
and calls for K ≥ St, where K is the option strike price. After some filtering to remove zero-bid
quotes (and sometimes larger bid quotes), the number of options actually fitted, Nopts, is shown
by the corresponding column in Tables 6-7.
An N -component Gaussian mixture model (GMM) is a weighted sum for the Q-measure
(risk-neutral) density for XT = logST /St, given at (4). Let’s write (4) as
qXT (x) =
∑N
i=1 wi φ(x;µi(T − t), σ2i (T − t)), where φ(x;µ, v) = exp(−(x − µ)2/2v)/
√
(2πv).
With discount factor Dt,T = exp(−rt,T τ), using τ := T − t, call values Ct,T are given by
Ct,T (St,K) = Dt,T E
Q
t
[
(ST −K)+
]
= Dt,T
N∑
i=1
wi Ci. (13)
In (13), undiscounted component call values Ci are found from routine calculations:
Ci = St e
(µi+
1
2
σ2i )τΦ(di,1)−KΦ(di,2), (14)
using di,1 =
log StK + µiτ
σi
√
τ
+ σi
√
τ, and di,2 = di,1 − σi
√
τ .
Similarly, for put values: Pt,T (St,K) = Dt,TE
Q
t [(K − ST )+] = Dt,T
∑N
i=1 wi Pi, where
Pi = KΦ(−di,2)− St e(µi+ 12σ
2
i )τΦ(−di,1). (15)
Free parameters {wi, µi, σi} are chosen to minimize an objective function subject to two con-
straints: (i) the norm condition:
∑N
i=1 wi = 1, and
(ii) the martingale condition :
N∑
i=1
wi e
(µi+
1
2
σ2i )τ = e(rt,T−δt,T )τ (16)
With the constraints, the GMM satisfies put-call parity, the model-independent relation:
Ct,T − Pt,T = St e−δt,T τ −K e−rt,T τ = e−rt,T τ (Ft,T −K). (17)
Discussion. Three comments:
(i) Consider the model-independent forward price Ft,T = E
Q
t [ST ] = St e
(rt,T−δt,T )τ , which can
be interpreted as the value of the undiscounted, zero-strike call option. With the GMM
(13), define component forward prices F it,T as the undiscounted, zero-strike, component
call values. From (14), F it,T = St e
(µi+
1
2
σ2i )τ . Thus, an equivalent version of the martingale
condition (16) is
∑N
i=1 wiF
i
t,T = Ft,T .
(ii) As one check, with N = 1, w1 = 1 and the martingale condition is µ1 +
1
2σ
2
1 = rt,T − δt,T .
With that, as expected, (13) reduces to the Black-Scholes call option formula.
(iii) As another check, consider the ERP at (8) for a risk-neutral agent: κ = 0. With the
martingale condition: ERP
(ann%)
t,T (κ = 0) = 0, as expected.
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Time measurements. Notice that column 2 in Tables 6-7 shows the integer number of calendar
days from the trade date to the expiration date of the options. When times to expirations, T − t,
are needed in option formulas such as (14), more precise time measurements were used.
For example, the first entry in Table 6 shows a PM (SPXW) option with 2 days to expiration.
Then, T − t, which is measured in years, was taken to be (2 + 0.25/24)/365, accounting for
option quotes 1/4-hour before the regular session close. Similarly, the 4th entry in the same
table shows an AM (SPX) option with 9 days to expiration. For that one T − t was taken to be
(9 + (0.25− 6.5)/24)/365, also accounting for the 6.5 hours from the opening to the close of the
regular trading session.8
4.2 Fitting methodology
I employed two goals, seeking to achieve “market-consistent” fits. First, free parameters were fit
by minimizing a smooth objective function: (18) below. It uses a particular average deviation
of GMM model prices from mid-point quotes (using out-of-the-money puts and calls). Call that
the “primary or nominal” objective function. Specifically, using Ci to indicate either a put or
call, I gave the optimizer the problem:
Primary objective: min
{~w,~µ,~σ}
1
Nopts
Nopts∑
i=1
(Cmkti − Cmodeli )2
Cmkti
, (18)
subject to the norm and martingale conditions.
Call that objective the ‘geometric average price error’ because the summand represents the
geometric average of: (i) the square price error (Cmkti − Cmodeli )2 and (ii) the relative price
error ((Cmkti − Cmodeli )/Cmkti )2. To understand this choice, we introduce the “secondary or
meta-objective” which was to
• Secondary objective: Find model prices lying within the bid-ask quotes.
After some experimentation with various nominal objective functions, I settled on (18) as a good
compromise in light of the secondary objective. For example, if you try to minimize simply the
price error, you highly weight close-to-the-money options. This will tend to generate model
prices for deep out-of-the-money options outside their bid-ask quotes, frustrating the secondary
objective. Alternatively, minimizing the relative price error over-emphasizes the deep out-of-the-
money options at the expense of the others. The geometric average is a balanced compromise.
Ideally, given the nominal objective, one could achieve fits where each model price lay within
bid-ask quotes. While this was possible to achieve at many expirations, it proved to be unrealistic
to insist on this. After all, the data is noisy and the model is imperfect. Instead, I adopted
the following criteria. First, given a model fit using the primary objective function, I computed
“Bid-ask Out statistics” or OutStats for short. The OutStats consisted of a two item list: (i)
the number of model prices that lay outside the bid-ask quotes, and (ii) the ‘worst-case’ error.
The worst case error is 0 if all the model prices lay within the bid-ask spread. Otherwise, it is the
largest absolute price difference between the model and the bid or ask (whichever was closest),
and rounded to the nearest $0.01. I also adopted the following qualitative description of the fits:
8While our calendar time measurement seems precise, there remains the possibility of a “business time vs.
calendar time” issue. In the tables, one sees the many ‘dual’ expirations with both AM and PM options expiring.
The ERP’s are reasonably close, given noisy/incomplete data and imperfect GMM fits. But, there might be
distortions in the ERPs (remember they are annualized) from the time measurement used here. The most
extreme case would be a trade date only one or two days from a dual expiration. While this possibility is not
realized in our data, if present, it might prompt some further time adjustment. Complicating any putative
business time adjustment would be the need to remove calendar spread arbitrage violations, the topic of Sec. 6.
14
• G (Good): the OutStats were (0, 0) or (n, $0.00); i.e., no outs, or a worst-case error that
penny rounds to $0.00;
• A (Acceptable): OutStats were (1, err) or (2, err); i.e. at most 2 outs with a positive error
after penny rounding;
• W (Weak; likely improvable): all other cases.
Examples. What do Good and Acceptable fits look like? Figure 5 shows an example of a Good
fit, with model prices shown as dots within the bid-ask intervals (vertical lines). To better see
where the model prices are located within the intervals, the inset graph shows expanded detail.
In the inset, all prices have been shifted downward by the mid-quote. Thus, if a model price
passed exactly through the mid-quote, the dot would be at zero in the inset. You can see that
all the model prices are close to being centered in the quote intervals.
Figure 6 shows an example of an Acceptable fit. Now there is more variation of the model
prices within the quote interval. Two model prices lie outside the intervals with a worst err =
$0.03. If you look carefully at the inset (on a monitor), you can see them: one is the 5th strike
from the left. The other is the 11th strike from the right, $0.03 below the bid.
The classification of all of the model fits for Feb 7, 2018 and Aug 8, 2018 is is shown in Tables
6-7. For those trade dates, you’ll see I was able to achieve either Good or Acceptable fits for each
expiration. The just-discussed Figures 5 and 6 are the fit detail for Files 2 and 6, respectively,
in Table 6.
For the third trade date examined, there was one expiration with aWeak fit, OutStats=(3,$0.01),
even after much experimentation.
Experimentation. We need to briefly discuss the optimizer: Mathematica’s FindMinimum. It’s
a nonlinear local optimizer, which accepts an objective function of parameters to fit, subject to
their constraints. While somewhat of a black-box, I have found it very reliable over many years
of use. It implements an Interior Point method and there is much online documentation.9 Two
of the settings are PrecisionGoal (PG in tables), and MaxIterations. The optimizer tries to
minimize the objective with PG good digits and within MaxIterations ‘steps’.
Imagine an optimization run using PG=5, MaxIterations=250, N = 4 (Gaussian compo-
nents), and using all out-of-the-money options with non-zero bids. The ‘Convergence’ column
in the tables indicates whether or not there was convergence, given PG and MaxIterations; if
you see ‘No’, then the steps tell you MaxIterations. In fact, as long as the fit was Good or
Acceptable, whether or not FindMinimum converged was irrelevant to me. That’s because, in
addition to having an acceptable fit, the fit error would often be lower without convergence.
But, if the results were a Weak fit, I would experiment with adjustments to the setup.
Almost always, this meant moving to N = 5 and/or truncating the option set by a few options
by boosting PutBidMin, a filter for the minimum put bid allowed.10 (Including all non-zero
bids uses PutBidMin=$0.05). You can see examples of this last adjustment in the tables. Once
an adjustment of PutBidMin had been made, I tried to stick with it for other expirations for
consistency. (The minimum Call bid was $0.05 in all optimizations).
In summary, given a trade date, my method started with a preliminary run through all
the expirations. If a fit was Weak, experimentation consisted of tweaking the various setup
parameters as explained, until a Good or Acceptable fit had been achieved. This proved to be
achievable, with one exception, over 3×42 expirations. Once these setup parameters were nailed
down, a final run was done — with the final setup and results shown in the tables.
9https://reference.wolfram.com/language/tutorial/ConstrainedOptimizationLocalNumerical.html
10On rare occasions, a Weak fit could be improved by moving from N = 5 to N = 4. This may seem paradoxical,
but remember that the optimizer knows nothing of the Secondary objective.
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5 Results
5.1 Results for densities
The fitted risk-neutral densities, Q(K/S0), real-world densities, P (K/S0), and their differences
Q − P are plotted in Figs. 10-12 for the Feb 7, 2018 expiration. The vertical axis of each
left-most figure has Q : n, where n is the File number in Table 6. This enables you to identify
the associated option expirations. To save space, I have just plotted the figures for the even file
numbers; the odd ones are similar. The real-world densities are estimated using κ = 3.
Notable features. All the densities are smooth and unimodal (single-peaked).11 While the
densities are known for K ∈ (0,∞), the plots only extend from the minimum to maximum
strikes used in the fits. The mass coverage under this range of strikes is generally very close to
one (but slightly less, of course), as suggested by the small values of the densities at their plotted
extremes. However, if you look at the furthest expirations, say Q:42, you can see the plots do
not reach the axis: the mass coverage is relatively smaller with those.
There is little apparent structure, except that one can see some slight “shoulders” in the
furthest expiration Q-densities. It’s hard to know if those are real features or just fitting artifacts,
perhaps connected with the lower mass coverage.
Of course, because of the risk-aversion, the Q-densities place more weight on the downside
returns, as shown by the difference plots in the third column.
5.2 Smile fits and extended smile fits
The option smile is a plot of the Black-Scholes implied volatility versus the strike price: IV (K).
There is a market smile and the fitted (GMM) model smile. Fig. 7 shows a typical example.
The top chart there shows the market (mid-quote) IV’s for the marketable strikes (dots) and
IV (K) for the GMM fit (smooth curve). The bottom chart extends the curve to much smaller
and larger strikes – giving the full picture of the model IV (K). I’ll explain the model results
and contrast them with related approaches from the literature.
By construction, the GMM RND has Gaussian tails. Gaussian tails imply IV (K) is ulti-
mately ‘flat’ as K → 0 or K →∞. This will be true under GMM’s or spline fits with Gaussian
extensions. However, approaches may differ in ‘near’ or ‘far’ extension behavior. Far behavior
refers to the ultimate IV asymptote(s). Near behavior refers to the shape of the extended IV (K)
for K close to Kmin and Kmax (the smallest and largest marketable strikes).
The GMM fit yields σmax := maxi{σi}, the largest of the fitted component σ’s from Sec.
4.1. Typically, σmax > IV (Kmin) (but not too much larger), where IV (Kmin) is the largest IV
in the fitted data set. It’s easy to show that IV (K) ultimately approaches σmax for both small
and large strikes: there is a common flat asymptote. But, because the SPX smile has such a
large skew: IV (Kmax)≪ IV (Kmin). The result is that, near Kmax, the near extension is much
more akin to an IV (K) slope extension than a flattening: again see Fig. 7. Consequently, while
the far extension (the asymptote) is indeed horizontal, the approach is very slow in moneyness
terms – certainly for the large strikes.
Those characteristics differ from the Table 1 methods with Gaussian extensions, which have
IV (K) near Kmax close to IV (Kmax). For example, (Bliss & Panigirtzoglou, 2004) and (Malz,
2014) use flat IV (K) extensions very close to IV (Kmin) and IV (Kmax). Thus, these alternative
methods yield two different asymptotes and these asymptotes are attained in the near region.
In my opinion, both the IV (K) slope matching the market, and the slow approach of IV (K)
to asymptotic flatness are attractive features of the GMM fit.
11In principle, the market could face an unusual risk, like a possible asteroid strike or imminent major war,
that resulted in a bi-modal density. In practice, single-name equities are the more likely place to see bi-modality.
There’s certainly nothing in general “no-arbitrage” principles that prevents it.
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5.3 Results for ERP’s
Figs. 2-4 show three examples of our new ERP term structure estimates. The top chart of each
figure has a linear time scale. But, because the nearest expirations are so close together, it’s hard
to resolved the chart data. So, the bottom chart of each figure shows the same term structure
with a logarithmic time scale.
Recall the trade dates were selected to have a relatively high, low, and middle-of-the-road
volatility environments. In the higher volatility environment, the ERP estimates decay from
a large value ≈ 26% (from 2-day options) toward the longer-run averages (from 2.5 year op-
tions). Conversely, in the lower volatility environment, the ERP term structure is increasing
with the term, again toward unconditional values. Finally, the last volatility environment yields
a relatively flat term structure.
Qualitatively, those are quite plausible results. The key drivers here are volatility and risk-
aversion. However, anything that the market becomes concerned about, as long as it is reflected
in the options market, can play a role in the results.
For Fig. 2, the ERP decay from 26% is quite rapid, suggesting that the market viewed the
Feb 5 volatility event as perhaps an “internal technical event” – similar examples being the Oct
19, 1987 crash or May 6, 2010 Flash crash. In other words, the volatility jump was not associated
with a systematic economic problem with long term persistence. Instead, it was internal because
the volatility increase – way beyond what would be expected, given the SPX decline – was
exaggerated due to market internals. Internal factors on Feb 5 included panic derivative trading
under loss of liquidity and consequent disruption in the volatility product space – events likely
to have only temporary effects on the broader equity market.
For Fig. 3, the ‘half-life’ associated to the rising ERP looks longer to me than the half-life
associated to the falling ERP in Fig. 2.
For Fig. 4, there is an interesting ‘hump shape’ near term in an otherwise ‘flattish’ term
structure. I don’t have any explanation for it.
For all the term structures, there are various small wiggles and oscillations. At this writing,
my guess is that those are just natural data/estimation noise and not indicative of some fine
structure in the market’s ‘true’ ERP’s.
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6 Removing calendar spread arbitrage if you must
Recall that our optimizer in (18) is fitting the GMM model to mid-point quotes ; i.e.,
Cmkti = 0.5×(Cbidi +Caski ), where i indexes the strikes. If you could transact at mid-point quotes
with no transaction costs (generally you can’t), you would often find two types of arbitrage
opportunities (‘arb opp’ for short):
• butterfly spread arbitrage, and
• calendar spread arbitrage.
The GMM fit, by construction, produces a model price free of butterfly spread arbitrage. The
absence of butterfly arbitrage is equivalent to having a proper (non-negative) risk-neutral density
Qt,T (ST ) and this occurs automatically with each fit.
In contrast, nothing in our fitting procedure (so far discussed) prevents calendar spread
arbitrage; indeed, you will see calendar spread arbitrage opportunities in fitted model prices.
As a practical matter, the main violations are seen in the AM/PM dual expirations, referring
to the Fridays where both an AM option (SPX) and PM option (SPXW) expire. For example,
in Table 6, there are seven such pairs. Using the file numbers of the first column, they are:
{(4, 5), (17, 18), (22, 23), (25, 26), (28, 29), (32, 33), (35, 36)}.
In general, the criterion for calendar spread arbitrage involves the cost-of-carry parameters.12
However, for the dual expirations, an arbitrage opportunity exists at t < TAM if:
for some strike K, Ct,TAM (K) > Ct,TPM (K) or Pt,TAM (K) > Pt,TPM (K). (19)
In words, if prior to expiration the (model) price of the AM expiration option exceeds the PM
price, there is an arbitrage opp. This is a well-known criterion for calendar spread arbitrage in
an environment with zero dividends and interest. In our case, we do have dividends and interest.
The reason (19) still applies is that exploiting the inequality involves a day trade: opening and
closing positions during the same regular trading session – as we now show.13
Exploiting the arbitrage opportunity. Let’s review the trading under two assumptions:
(A1) no transaction costs or margin requirements.
(A2) dividends and interest accrue (or are owed) only to positions maintained overnight.
Our assumptions combine aspects of ‘ideal’ and ‘realistic’ markets. First, suppose at some
t < TAM , there is some strike K such that Ct,TAM (K) > Ct,TPM (K). We sell the AM option
and buy the PM option which generates an account credit x = Ct,TAM (K)−Ct,TPM (K) > 0. At
time TAM , if STAM ≤ K, the sold option expires worthless and the PM option can be sold for
the non-negative amount CTAM ,TPM . Thus, with no initial investment, we have earned a positive
profit: x+ CTAM ,TPM > 0.
The other possibility is that STAM > K, in which case the AM option is cash-settled at
STAM − K, a positive amount which we owe the option buyer. To meet that obligation, we
borrow the stock and immediately sell it into the market at price STAM = (STAM − K) + K.
After paying the buyer, our account, at time TAM , now consists of (i) cash, totaling x+K, and
(ii) a short position in one share of the stock (index). Now, what happens at time TPM?
If STPM > K, we now receive STPM −K from the cash-settlement of the PM option, so our
net cash is now x+ STPM . We immediately buy the stock in the market for STPM , which closes
our short position and leaves us with cash x > 0, our arbitrage profit.
12See (Fengler, 2005).
13I adapt a nice discussion at
https://quant.stackexchange.com/questions/15215/how-to-exploit-calendar-arbitrage
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On the other hand, if STPM ≤ K, our long call expires worthless and we again buy the stock
to close our short position for the price STPM . This reduces our cash to x + K − STPM . But
x+K − STPM ≥ x > 0 because K ≥ STPM .
Thus, with no initial investment, we are able to earn a positive profit of at least x > 0 under
any eventuality, almost the classic definition of an arbitrage opportunity.14
What is the effect of dividends and interest? Initially, we have options only and no dividends
accrue (or are owed) to the account from t through TAM . On expiration day, the short sale
of the stock would generate a potential obligation to pay dividends if the short position were
maintained overnight, but it isn’t: it’s closed out the same day. That’s the day trade part.
Interest earnings (or payments) can change the windfall profit from the exploit, but not its
sign. For example, the initial credit x may earn interest from t to TAM in a positive interest
rate environment. This would only increase our profit to some x′ > 0. Conversely, although
not currently a factor in the US, at this writing negative interest rates are common in Europe.
With negative rates, that initial credit would be reduced to some x′ by expiration day, where
0 < x′ < x. This is still positive – so we still earn an arbitrage profit under (19).
In summary, the cost-of-carry parameters (rt,T , δt,T ) can be neglected in determining if an
arbitrage opportunity exists with dual expiration pairs: for those, criterion (19) suffices.
Calendar arbitrage in GMM fits and its removal. It’s quite common to see (19) hold
(for some ranges of strikes) in the GMM fits to our data. For two examples, consider the two
expiration pairs (17,18) and (35,36) from Table 6. Figures 8-9 show the situation. There are
three charts per figure. The top chart shows the difference between the PM and AM option
prices both in the data (the dots) and the GMM fit (the curve). The middle chart shows just
the GMM fit differences for clarity. The bottom chart shows the ‘fix’ – explained below. Recall
we always use out-of-the-money options, so the difference is Pt,TPM (K)−Pt,TAM (K) for K < St
and Ct,TPM (K)− Ct,TAM (K) for K ≥ St. For the (17,18) expiration, there are 21 strikes (dots)
with negative values; for the (35,36) expiration there are 71.
What causes calendar arbitrage in the model? One cause is calendar arbitrage in the data.
In Fig. 8, you can see that CGMMt,TPM (K) < C
GMM
t,TAM
(K) for strikes above K = 3100. If you look at
the market data (the dots), although quite noisy, it’s clear that the GMM fit is roughly following
the data, which is a good thing. The data turns negative above K = 3000, and the model fit is
following it down. The same type of thing is seen in the top chart of Fig. 9.
The main ingredient to my ‘fix’, which is shown in the bottom chart of the figures is simply
to shift the market price that is being fitted by a small amount, so that the calendar arbitrage
is no longer present in the data. Recall that we are fitting to the mid-point quote, which is the
average of the bid and ask quote. Since our secondary objective is to get a model fit between
the bid and ask, fitting to the mid-quote is the natural choice. But there is nothing sacrosanct
about the mid-quote. We can fit to some other price within the bid-ask range if it is convenient.
Which prices should be shifted?
First, I shift the market price of the PM option by a small positive increment when there was
a calendar arb violation at the mid-quote vs. the corresponding AM option. The AM option
price is left unaltered. Specifically, for the examples shown, I chose the increment to be 0.005 ×
the mid-quote price ( 1
2
of 1%) or $0.01, whichever was larger. With that rule (and certain other
data ‘cleanups’ explained below), the resulting GMM fits are shown as the solid curves in the
bottom charts of Figures 8-9.
The other way to go about it, which I do next, is to decease the market price of the AM
option by the same rule, and re-run the fits. In this case, the PM option prices is left unaltered.
Those results are plotted as the dashed curves in the bottom charts of Figures 8-9. The two
curves are very close, so you have to look carefully to see the dashing. As you can see, the fits
are now calendar-arb-free under either adjustment procedure.
14The classic definition is weaker, requiring only a non-negative profit, strictly positive under some outcome.
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Before explaining the other data clean-up issues, let me show the effect of the adjustments
on the corresponding row entries in Table 6. In Table 8, the top panel repeats the previous
results from Table 6. The middle panel shows the results of the fit after adjusting (upward)
the market prices for the PM options. As you can see, the ERP’s have increased somewhat for
the PM options (SPXW). This is not surprising, as higher option prices means higher implied
volatilities, which suggests higher ERP’s for a risk-averse agent. Finally, the bottom panel shows
the results of the fit after adjusting (downward) the market prices for the AM options. Those
ERP’s have decreased, again not surprising by the same rationale.
Other data cleanups/adjustments as part of calendar arb removal. Recall the index
forward price at trade date t for option expiration T is Ft,T = St exp{(rt,T − δt,T )(T − t)}. With
the VIX white paper method for the cost-of-carry parameters (under the original procedures),
I took the risk-free rate rt,T from the US Treasury (interpolated) yield curve, using the whole
number of calendar days from t to T . This meant that, for paired expirations, the AM and PM
values of r were identical. However, since T − t differed for the AM and PM expirations, the
factors exp{(rt,T (T − t)} were slightly different. Also, the AM and PM option-implied forward
prices were slightly different, which meant that the dividend yields δ were slightly different.
For example, for the (17,18) paired expiration (r, δ, F )AM = (0.01376, 0.02376, 2703.76) and
(r, δ, F )PM = (0.01376, 0.02314, 2703.91).
Now, the day trade discussion above suggested to me that a better setup would be to enforce
identical forward prices for the AM and PM expirations. That way, the implied dollar dividends
and implied dollar interest earnings would be the same for the two expirations. That notion was
used in the discussion above, and corresponds to the market practice that interest and dividend
earnings are based upon overnight holding periods. Since the number of overnight holding periods
for (t, TAM ) and (t, TPM ) are identical, so should be the corresponding forward prices. So, one
additional data adjustment here takes the PM option-implied forward and corresponding (r, δ) as
“correct” – since those are based upon the more standard close rather than open. Then, adjust
(rAM , δAM ) so that rAMTAM = rPMTPM and δAMTAM = δPMTPM . For the (17) expiration,
the cost-of-carrys after this adjustment was (r, δ, F )AM = (0.01387, 0.02331, 2703.91). This is
one reason why you see slightly different results (compared to the top panel) for the ‘After’ fits
in Table 8 for both AM and PM fits.
You will also notice from Table 8 that, for the (35,36) expiration, the adjustment included
a different PutBidMin cutoff and consequent different number of options fitted. The reason
for that adjustment was that, with PutBidMin=$0.05, the (35) expiration had option quotes
extending down to K = 200 with a corresponding mid-quote IV of 0.85. But the (36) expiration
had option quotes extending down only to K = 900 with a mid-quote IV of 0.45. Now the
GMM fit tends to produce a σmax, the maximum of the fitted volatilities {σi}, that roughly
moves up and down with the maximum IV of the data. With such a large disparity in the max
IV’s of the data, one would expect to find σmax(AM) > σmax(PM) and indeed that was the
result: σmax(AM) = 0.65 and σmax(PM) = 0.47. That discrepancy will lead to asymptotic
calendar arb violations as K → 0 or K →∞.15 To avoid those, I boosted PutBidMin to $0.15,
which resulted in more aligned data with a minimum strike of K = 925 for both AM and PM,
and consequent adjusted fit σmax(AM) = 0.46 and σmax(PM) = 0.47, resolving that issue. In
response, the ERP for the (35) expiration moved down slightly.
15Equivalent to (19) under our assumptions is IV 2
AM
(K)TAM > IV
2
PM
(K)TPM for a calendar arb violation.
As K → 0 or K → ∞, that translates to σ2max(AM)TAM > σ
2
max(PM)TPM . But since TAM and TPM are so
close, σmax(AM) = 0.65 and σmax(PM) = 0.47 ensures a violation.
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Table 5: Feb 7, 2018: ERP before and after calendar spread arbitrage adjustments.
File/ Expiration ERP
Root Date (days-to-go) Before After
17 SPX Mar 16, 2018 (37) 10.43 10.31
18 SPXW Mar 16, 2018 (37) 10.39 10.49
35 SPX Dec 21, 2018 (317) 7.37 7.335
36 SPXW Dec 21, 2108 (317) 7.36 7.375
Final adjusted estimates. Our final adjusted estimate for the ERP’s is the simple average of
the ERP from Table 8 under the two adjustment procedures. Those final estimates are shown
in Table 5. For example, the first row of Table 5 has an ‘After’ value of 10.31, which the average
of 10.42 from the first row of Table 8/Panel II and 10.20 from the first row of Table 8/Panel III.
Are these adjustments worth the trouble? If one were trying to generate an arbitrage-free
implied volatility surface from GMM fits, then calendar arb violations should be removed.
However, we aren’t doing that – instead, we are trying to estimate ERP term structures.
As you can see from Table 5, the ERP changes due to these adjustments (at least for these
examples) are relatively modest.
One issue is whether or not you feel the need to distinguish the AM ERP’s from the PM
ERP’s. We have done so here. But, if you don’t, you can just average the original (unadjusted)
pair ERP values and be done with it. For example, for Table 5, those pair averages are, for the
Mar 16 expiration: 10.41 (before adj.) and 10.40 (after adj.). Also, for the Dec 21 expiration:
7.365 (before adj.) and 7.355 (after adj.) – clearly, those tiny differences are not worth the
trouble.
If you do want to distinguish the AM/PM ERP’s, you can attempt some adjustment as we
have done and then decide if the differences matter for your purpose. As a final caveat, we
remind the reader of Footnote 8, which mentions the possibility of needing business time vs.
calendar time corrections for very short-dated dual expirations.
7 Sensitivity of the ERP to the cost of carry methodology
The ERP results shown in Figs. 2-4 and corresponding Tables 6-7 use the ‘VIX white paper
method’ for (r, δ)’s – a method explained in Sec. 3.1.1.
For that method, the risk-free rate is the corresponding US Treasury rate for the same
maturity as the option expiration. Is that the best choice? The average effective financing
(or investing) rate for professional option traders and market makers is not directly observable.
Take financing, for example. Typically, a market making firm will have (perhaps several) so-
called “prime brokers”, which provide custody, clearing, securities lending, financing, and other
services. As the prime broker is typically a division of a large investment/money center bank, the
bank/broker is able to borrow dollars at benchmark rates like Fed Funds and LIBOR (overnight
and term).16
Consequently the market maker will be offered financing at benchmark rates plus a (non-
observable) negotiable spread. Another non-observable is the term: market makers may choose
16While USD LIBOR is currently referenced in financial contracts with some $200 trillion in notional value,
it’s likely going to be replaced as a reference rate as early as 2021. U.S. monetary authorities have identified the
Secured Overnight Financing Rate (SOFR) as the rate that represents best practice for use in certain new USD
derivatives and other financial contracts. See https://www.newyorkfed.org/arrc/sofr-transition for more
about the planned transition from LIBOR.
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to finance their book at overnight rates or perhaps lock-in a term rate. Nevertheless, these
considerations do suggest financing rates closer to overnight LIBOR plus some spread. Excess
cash might be swept into an institutional money fund. The net result is we have an effective
risk-free rate r – not observable but likely different than the term US Treasury rate.
Additional issues occur with the dividend yields we have estimated. To take an example,
consider Expiration (File number) 31 in Table 6, which is the Feb 7, 2018 trade date with
option expiration in 174 days, so almost half a year out. If you look at the corresponding
row entry in Table 9 you’ll see the VIX white paper method produced an r = 1.70% and
δ = 1.34%. From the S&P Dow Jones Indices website17, the total dividend points earned from
a holder of the S&P500 index in 2017 was D = 49.01. This means the trailing 12-month (TTM)
dividend yield on Feb 7, 2018 was approximately δTTM ≈ 49.01/2706.48 = 1.81%. So, if you
simply projected the historical dividend yield forward, it makes the VIX white paper δ look
low. Indeed, the subsequent realized yield over this 174 day period was actually δ = 1.94% (see
below). Also, a glance at FRED18 shows LIBOR on that date was rLIBOR = 1.44% (Overnight),
while rLIBOR = 2.00% (6-month).
Because of these various ambiguities, I investigated a second cost of carry method.
7.1 Cost of carry: a put-call-parity regression method.
The method is very easy. Fixing a trade date t and expiration T , and indexing the available
strikes as Ki, we can write the put-call parity relation (17) as(
Pi − Ci
Ki
)
= e−rτ − e−δτ
(
St
Ki
)
.
This suggests simply estimating the OLS regression
yi = a+ bxi + ǫi, (20)
where yi = (Pi − Ci)/Ki and xi = St/Ki, where (Pi, Ci) are the mid-quotes for strike Ki. The
estimated coefficient (a, b) = (e−rτ ,−e−δτ ) and (r, δ) estimates follow. Let (rreg , δreg) denote
‘regression’ estimates. They are seen in the right half of Table 9.
In the last table column, I show the subsequent ‘Realized yield’, call it δreal, known (at this
writing) for all expirations except the last two. It was computed from the relation δreal × T =
log(1+DIVPTS/S0), where T = days/365 (whole number of days). Here DIVPTS is the S&P500
dividend points earned between the two dates, computable from data provided at the website
in Footnote 17. As one sees, for Expiration 31, we now find rreg = 2.36%, δreg = 1.97%, and
δreal = 1.94%. So, δreg was a good forecast. Note that the forward price estimates are quite
close between the methods – thus, increases in δ with the regression method imply increases in
r to keep the forward price about the same.
Unfortunately, a comparison of all expirations shows the regression δ′s are an evident im-
provement only for the more distant half of the expirations, say Expiration 21 and beyond. For
expirations less than 60 days out, neither method seems to be a particularly good forecaster of
realized dividends.
For each option expiration regression, I used every available strike: (i) with a put-call pair,
and (ii) with non-zero bids. If you plot the data in (20), it’s virtually indistinguishable from the
fitted line, with the various R2 (and adjusted R2) all extremely close to 1. Specifically, I found
1−R2 in the range 10−8 to 10−6 for all expirations.
The key issue is: what happens to the ERP’s? The ERP columns in Table 9 are highlighted in
bold. They show generally a difference less than 0.1 percentage points between the two methods.
That is, |ERP1 − ERP2| < 0.1, when the ERP’s are reported in annualized percents as I do.
17https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500-dividend-points-index-annual
18https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/USD6MTD156N
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The story for the Aug 8, 2018 trade date is similar. For that one, in Table 10, I just show
the first and last 4 files for brevity. Again, while the (r, δ)’s change significantly under the two
methods, the option-implied forward prices are close, and this leads to very similar ERP’s.
My conclusion is that either cost-of-carry method is suitable for the ERP: use whatever is
convenient. The cost-of-carrys from the regression method are not uniformly an improvement
over the VIX white paper method – although they do seem closer to the experienced costs for
expirations at least 2 months distant. If all you seek is an ERP estimate, these (r, δ) differences
may not matter.
8 The order of the density transformations
Let Tκ denote an exponential change-of-measure transformation with parameter κ. That is, Tκ
transforms suitable probability densities f(x) into new probability densities. (f is suitable if
e−κxf(x) ∈ L1). More specifically, define f (κ) = Tκ(f) to mean:
f (κ)(x) = Tκ(f)(x) := e
−κx f(x)∫
e−κxf(x) dx
. (21)
With that notation, the transformations of (6) can be written succinctly as
qX¯T = Tκ(pX¯T ) ⇔ pX¯T = T−κ(qX¯T ). (22)
Recall that these are transformations of log-total-return pdf’s, hence the ‘bars’. From options, we
find RND’s for the log-price-returns; we needed to move from those to log-total-returns because
the latter is what follows from the market-clearing equilibrium model of the Appendix. That
move was accomplished by another simple transformation, Sc, a shift operator. Here, if f(x) is
any pdf on the real line, and c is a real number, then g = Scf means g(x) = f(x− c). Obviously
g(x) is also a pdf. With that notation, we start with qXT (x) from the GMM option fit, and get
qX¯T (x) from qX¯T = Sc qXT , where c = δt,T × (T − t); this is simply (5) again. Combining,
pX¯T = (T−κ Sc)(qXT ), where c = δt,T × (T − t). (23)
A natural question: could we have reversed the order? That is, could we have started with
the risk-neutral log-price-return density, next performed an exponential change of measure, then
shifted to a log-total-return density? It’s easy to see the answer is ‘yes’. After all, if f is an
arbitrary (suitable) pdf, and c is any real number, then
g1(x) := (Tκ Sc)(f)(x) = e
−κx f(x− c)∫
e−κxf(x− c) dx =
e−κ(x−c) f(x− c)∫
e−κxf(x) dx
,
while
g2(x) := (Sc Tκ)(f)(x) = Sc e
−κx f(x)∫
e−κxf(x) dx
=
e−κ(x−c) f(x− c)∫
e−κxf(x) dx
.
So, g1 = g2 and the operations commute. There are two distinct, but equivalent, ways to move
from the source, qXT , to the target: the real-world log-total-return density, pX¯t . Schematically,
with the source density at the upper left and the target density at the lower right:
qX qX¯
pX pX¯
Sc
T
−κ T−κ
Sc
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9 Conclusions
We’ve explored in detail an attractive method to estimate ERP term structure. Risk-neutral
densities are estimated by fitting Gaussian mixture models to option quotes. Real-world densities
follow via an exponential change of measure. Finally, ERP’s are found by a simple analytic
formula, (8), using fitted parameters plus κ. We used κ = 3± 0.5, a plausible range based upon
the historical record. In any event, under our assumptions, (8) holds for arbitrary κ.
Examples used relatively high, low, and middling volatility environments. The estimated ERP
term structures seemed sensible. The estimates were shown relatively insensitive to both (i)
changes in the cost-of-carry method and (ii) the removal of small calendar-arbitrage violations.
Calendar arb violations were driven largely by violations in the data, specifically in the mid-
quotes at the dual SPX/SPXW expirations; we gave a method to remove them from the GMM
fits, and consequent ERP estimates, if desired. If you don’t feel compelled to distinguish AM/PM
ERP’s, which represent horizons only 6 12 hours apart, I’d say it’s a non-issue.
Computations were done in Mathematica and were sometimes tedious. It would be useful to
improve the run-times, perhaps by better parallelization.
A natural question for follow-up work: are the ERP’s predictive? The likely answer is that
they’re weakly predictive. Our historical CRRA fits suggest, but do not prove, that our forward-
looking ERP’s have predictive power. Another argument for weak predictive power follows from
the clear association of our ERP estimates with the volatility environment. In my experience
(known literature plus unpublished personal research), time series (stochastic process) models
with volatility-in-mean are weak predictors of S&P 500 returns.
The theoretical rationale for some predictive ability is a common one: risk-averse investors
will discount prices to accommodate increased volatility. At the same time, because there is
a risk-return trade-off – higher expected returns are associated with higher volatility – the
forecasting power is weak.
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Figure 1: The CBOE’s VIX index: 2018-2019
Jan 2018 Jul 2018 Jan 2019 Jul 2019
0
10
20
30
VIX Index (arrows show option trade dates fitted)
↑ ↑ ↑
Feb 7 Aug 8 Jun 26
25
Figure 2: Equity Risk Premium Term Structure:
2 days after the “Volpocalypse” (VIX=27.73).
(Bands computed with CRRA κ = 3± 0.5).
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Figure 3: Equity Risk Premium Term Structure: VIX at local low (10.85)
(Bands computed with CRRA κ = 3± 0.5).
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Figure 4: Equity Risk Premium Term Structure: mid-teen VIX (16.21)
(Bands computed with CRRA κ = 3± 0.5).
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Figure 5: Example of ‘Good’ GMM fit:
Trade date: Feb 7, 2018. Expiration date: Feb 12, 2018
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Figure 6: Example of ‘Acceptable’ GMM fit:
Trade date: Feb 7, 2018. Expiration date: Feb 20, 2018
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Figure 7: Smile and Extended Smile Fits:
Trade date: Feb 7, 2018. Expiration date: Feb 12, 2018
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Figure 8: Example Removal of Calendar Spread Arbitrage.
PM minus AM option prices. Trade date: Feb 7, 2018. Expiration date: Mar 16, 2018
Top: Market Data (dots) + original GMM fit to market mid-quotes (curve).
Middle: Original GMM fit.
Bottom: GMM fit to adjusted market quotes: Solid=PM adjusted. Dashed=AM adjusted.
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Figure 9: Example Removal of Calendar Spread Arbitrage.
PM minus AM option prices. Trade date: Feb 7, 2018. Expiration date: Dec 21, 2018
Top: Market Data (dots) + original GMM fit to market mid-quotes (curve).
Middle: Original GMM fit.
Bottom: GMM fit to adjusted market quotes: Solid=PM adjusted. Dashed=AM adjusted.
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Figure 10: RNDs (Q) and RWDs (P): Feb 7, 2018
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Figure 11: RNDs (Q) and RWDs (P): Feb 7, 2018 (cont.)
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Figure 12: RNDs (Q) and RWDs (P): Feb 7, 2018 (cont.)
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10 Appendix – representative agent/power utility model
10.1 General theory
Consider a discrete-time securities market with a probability measure P, information flow It,
and time-t conditional expectations Et [· · · ]. The fundamental theorem of asset pricing provides
that, under the absence of arbitrage opportunities, there exists a positive stochastic discount
factor (process) mt,T that prices every traded security via:
19
Pt = Et [mt,TPT ] , for all t ≤ T. (24)
Critically, the same stochastic discount factor process prices every security. Recalling our earlier
notation, for risk-free discount bonds maturing at T , PT = 1, and so
Dt,T = e
−rt,T (T−t) = Et [mt,T ] . (25)
Thus (24) is equivalent to a discounted expectation under an inferred Q-measure, via
Pt = Dt,T
Et [mt,TPT ]
Et [mt,T ]
= Dt,T E
Q
t [PT ] . (26)
Next, our representative agent model fleshes this out – makes explicit mt,T – and leads to the
previous relation (6) for the change of measures.
10.2 A representative agent with power utility
We assume security prices {Pt} are set by a representative agent with wealth Wt who makes
portfolio choices to maximize an expected power utility function of return:
U¯(Wt) = e
−ρ(T−t) Et
[
1
1− κ
(
WT
Wt
)1−κ]
. (27)
Here ρ ≥ 0 is a time-impatience rate, κ ≥ 0 is the Arrow-Pratt CRRA. When κ > 0, the agent is
strictly risk-averse, and when κ = 0, risk-neutral. The case κ = 1 is interpreted as log(WT /Wt).
Fixing both t and T , assume the agent’s investment universe contains three traded securities:
• The risk-free bond, here a contract between individuals, with price Dt,T = e−rt,T (T−t).
• A broad-based (equity) market index, with price S¯t. This is a total-return index, which
includes reinvested dividends.
• A generic contingent claim, also a contract between individuals, with price Vt,T , maturity
T , and buyer payoff VT = w(log S¯T ) with generic payoff function w(·).
Since the risk-free bond, as described, is a type of ‘generic contingent claim’, it’s redundant in the
above list. But there is no harm singling it out. The agent, with wealth Wt optimally allocates
wealth fractions: x to the discount bond, y to the generic contingent claim, and 1 − x − y to
stocks. The agent’s optimization problem is:
max
x,y
U¯ = max
x,y
Et
[(
(1− x− y) S¯T
S¯t
+
x
Dt,T
+ y
VT
Vt,T
)1−κ]
, (28)
dropping multiplicative constants that do not affect the optimization. Market clearing implies
the agent’s optimal solution lies at x∗ = y∗ = 0. In other words, the equity index must absorb
19A careful textbook treatment is found in (Back, 2010).
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100% of the representative agent’s wealth Wt. The other securities (the discount bond and the
derivative) do exist and are traded in this market. But as contracts between individuals (like
puts, calls, and futures), they are in zero net supply.
The two first order conditions are:
(i)
∂
∂x
U¯
∣∣∣∣
x=y=0
= 0 and (ii)
∂
∂y
U¯
∣∣∣∣
x=y=0
= 0,
which yields:
Dt,T =
Et
[(
S¯T
S¯t
)−κ]
Et
[(
S¯T
S¯t
)1−κ] and Vt,T =
Et
[(
S¯T
St
)−κ
VT
]
Et
[(
S¯T
S¯t
)1−κ] . (29)
Substituting the denominator for Vt,T with the same denominator from Dt,T yields
Vt,T = Dt,T E
Q
t [VT ] , where E
Q
t [VT ] :=
Et
[(
S¯T
S¯t
)−κ
VT
]
Et
[(
S¯T
S¯t
)−κ] . (30)
Since the contingent claim is arbitrary, (30) serves as an example of (26), now with:
mt,T =
(
S¯T
S¯t
)−κ
= e−κX¯T . (31)
Recall our previous notations: X¯T = log(S¯T /S¯t). Also, recall pX¯T (x) and qX¯T (x) denote the
corresponding P/Q total-return pdf’s. Then, it’s easy to see that (30)-(31) imply the density
transformations used in the main body at (6) or given formally at (22). Those transformations
were asserted to follow from our representative agent model, and now we’ve shown they do.
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Table 6: ERP estimated term structure: SPX options on Feb 7, 2018.
File/ Expiration Put- Bid-Ask Convergence ERP Run
Root Date (days-to-go) BidMin N PG Nopts OutStats (steps) (κ = 3) time
1 SPXW Feb 9, 2018 (2) 0.05 5 5 139 A(1,0.05) No(250) 26.34 1055
2 SPXW Feb 12, 2018 (5) 0.05 5 5 127 G(0,0) Yes(133) 16.21 484
3 SPXW Feb 14, 2018 (7) 0.05 5 5 142 A(1,0.01) Yes(115) 16.16 538
4 SPX Feb 16, 2018 (9) 0.05 5 5 239 A(1,0.08) Yes(174) 15.73 1076
5 SPXW Feb 16, 2018 (9) 0.05 5 5 228 A(1,0.03) No(250) 15.93 1554
6 SPXW Feb 20, 2018 (13) 0.05 5 5 147 A(2,0.03) Yes(75) 12.26 312
7 SPXW Feb 21, 2018 (14) 0.05 5 5 148 G(0,0) Yes(66) 12.43 263
8 SPXW Feb 23, 2018 (16) 0.05 5 5 185 G(0,0) Yes(118) 12.78 719
9 SPXW Feb 26, 2018 (19) 0.05 4 5 145 G(0,0) Yes(198) 11.34 412
10 SPXW Feb 28, 2018 (21) 0.40 4 5 175 A(1,0.06) Yes(102) 11.80 426
11 SPXW Mar 2, 2018 (23) 0.05 4 5 199 G(0,0) No(250) 12.14 985
12 SPXW Mar 5, 2018 (26) 0.05 4 5 128 A(1,0.11 Yes(65) 10.93 156
13 SPXW Mar 7, 2018 (28) 0.05 4 5 131 G(0,0) Yes(44) 10.91 135
14 SPXW Mar 9, 2018 (30) 0.05 4 5 176 A(1,0.02) Yes(79) 11.54 305
15 SPXW Mar 12, 2018 (33) 0.05 4 5 127 G(0,0) Yes(35) 10.21 86
16 SPXW Mar 14, 2018 (35) 0.05 4 5 104 G(0,0) Yes(103) 10.20 135
17 SPX Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 G(0,0) Yes(77) 10.43 309
18 SPXW Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 A(1,0.01) Yes(217) 10.39 878
19 SPXW Mar 23, 2018 (44) 0.05 4 5 159 G(0,0) Yes(42) 10.01 167
20 SPXW Mar 29, 2018 (50) 0.05 4 5 198 G(0,0) Yes(59) 9.55 236
21 SPXW Apr 6, 2018 (58) 0.05 4 5 143 G(0,0) Yes(90) 8.93 333
22 SPX Apr 20, 2018 (72) 0.05 4 5 244 A(1,0.08) Yes(64) 8.72 269
23 SPXW Apr 20, 2018 (72) 0.05 5 5 246 A(2,0.01) Yes(156) 8.64 1046
24 SPXW Apr 30, 2018 (82) 0.05 4 5 106 G(0,0) Yes(137) 8.39 177
25 SPX May 18, 2018 (100) 0.05 4 5 168 G(0,0) Yes(35) 8.52 126
26 SPXW May 18, 2018 (100) 0.05 4 5 167 G(0,0) Yes(44) 8.50 163
27 SPXW May 31, 2018 (113) 0.05 4 5 60 G(0,0) Yes(73) 8.25 86
28 SPX Jun 15, 2018 (128) 0.05 4 5 93 A(1,0.04) No(250) 8.23 306
29 SPXW Jun 15, 2018 (128) 0.05 4 5 95 A(2,0.05) Yes(95) 8.17 115
30 SPXW Jun 29, 2018 (142) 0.05 4 5 167 G(0,0) Yes(29) 8.10 107
31 SPXW Jul 31, 2018 (174) 0.05 4 5 87 G(0,0) Yes(34) 7.79 43
32 SPX Sep 21, 2018 (226) 0.05 4 5 86 G(0,0) Yes(109) 7.56 132
33 SPXW Sep 21, 2018 (226) 0.05 4 5 87 G(0,0) Yes(46) 7.53 55
34 SPXW Sep 28, 2018 (233) 0.05 4 5 63 G(0,0) Yes(90) 7.52 109
35 SPX Dec 21, 2018 (317) 0.05 4 5 105 A(1,0.05) No(250) 7.37 324
36 SPXW Dec 21, 2108 (317) 0.05 4 5 98 G(0,0) Yes(63) 7.36 76
37 SPXW Dec 31, 2018 (327) 0.05 4 5 62 G(0,0) Yes(44) 7.47 53
38 SPX Jan 18, 2019 (345) 0.05 4 5 89 G(0,0) Yes(39) 7.25 47
39 SPX Mar 15, 2019 (401) 0.05 4 5 85 G(0,0) Yes(147) 7.29 176
40 SPX Jun 21, 2019 (499) 0.05 4 5 92 G(0,0) Yes(60) 7.28 73
41 SPX Dec 20, 2019 (681) 0.30 4 5 93 G(0,0) No(250) 7.23 309
42 SPX Dec 18, 2020 (1045) 0.30 4 5 96 G(0,0) No(250) 7.67 301
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Table 7: ERP estimated term structure: SPX options on Aug 8, 2018.
File/ Expiration Put- Bid-Ask Convergence ERP Run
Root Date (days-to-go) BidMin N PG Nopts OutStats (steps) (κ = 3) time
1 SPXW Aug 10, 2018 (2) 0.10 5 5 31 G(0,0) Yes(63) 2.02 120
2 SPXW Aug 13, 2018 (5) 0.10 5 5 51 G(0,0) Yes(62) 1.45 119
3 SPXW Aug 15, 2018 (7) 0.10 5 5 87 A(2,0.01) Yes(76) 1.87 183
4 SPX Aug 17, 2018 (9) 0.10 5 5 112 A(2,0.01) Yes(67) 2.06 361
5 SPXW Aug 17, 2018 (9) 0.10 5 5 119 A(2,0.02) Yes(73) 2.18 463
6 SPXW Aug 20, 2018 (12) 0.10 5 5 117 G(0,0) Yes(57) 1.99 356
7 SPXW Aug 22, 2018 (14) 0.10 5 5 122 G(0,0) Yes(68) 2.22 439
8 SPXW Aug 24, 2018 (16) 0.10 5 5 162 G(0,0) No(250) 2.43 1623
9 SPXW Aug 27, 2018 (19) 0.10 5 5 121 G(1,0.00) No(250) 2.30 1506
10 SPXW Aug 29, 2018 (21) 0.10 5 5 106 A(1,0.01) No(250) 2.48 1316
11 SPXW Aug 31, 2018 (23) 0.10 5 5 164 G(1,0.00) No(250) 2.67 1589
12 SPXW Sep 4, 2018 (27) 0.10 5 5 109 A(2,0.04) No(250) 2.49 1321
13 SPXW Sep 5, 2018 (28) 0.10 5 5 109 A(2,0.04) No(250) 2.53 1288
14 SPXW Sep 7, 2018 (30) 0.20 5 5 164 A(1,0.02) No(250) 2.70 1714
15 SPXW Sep 10, 2018 (33) 0.10 5 5 111 A(2,0.02) No(250) 2.62 1307
16 SPXW Sep 12, 2018 (35) 0.10 5 5 105 G(0,0) No(250) 2.75 1279
17 SPXW Sep 14, 2018 (37) 0.10 5 5 166 A(2,0.03) No(250) 2.87 1612
18 SPX Sep 21, 2018 (44) 0.20 5 5 236 A(1,0.01) No(250) 3.07 1631
19 SPXW Sep 21, 2018 (44) 0.20 5 5 236 A(1,0.01 No(250) 3.11 1601
20 SPXW Sep 28, 2018 (51) 0.10 5 5 205 A(1,0.03) No(250) 3.33 1594
21 SPXW Oct 5, 2018 (58) 0.10 5 5 151 G(0,0) Yes(187) 3.43 1210
22 SPXW Oct 12, 2018 (65) 0.10 5 5 151 G(0,0) Yes(224) 3.52 1405
23 SPX Oct 19, 2018 (72) 0.10 5 5 248 A(1,0.03) No(250) 3.60 1598
24 SPXW Oct 19, 2018 (72) 0.10 5 5 247 G(0,0) No(250) 3.63 1591
25 SPXW Oct 31, 2018 (84) 0.10 5 5 167 A(2,0.01) Yes(121) 3.80 756
26 SPX Nov 16, 2018 (100) 0.10 5 5 238 A(1,0.05) No(250) 4.11 1572
27 SPXW Nov 16, 2018 (100) 0.10 5 5 238 A(1,0.01) No(250) 4.15 1589
28 SPXW Nov 30, 2108 (114) 0.10 5 5 100 G(1,0.00) Yes(108) 4.29 533
29 SPX Dec 21, 2018 (135) 0.10 5 5 95 A(2,0.06) Yes(223) 4.44 571
30 SPXW Dec 21, 2018 (135) 0.20 5 5 96 G(0,0) No(250) 4.45 676
31 SPXW Dec 31, 2018 (145) 0.10 5 5 189 G(0,0) Yes(90) 4.42 564
32 SPX Jan 18, 2019 (163) 0.10 5 5 91 G(1,0.00) No(250) 4.54 663
33 SPXW Jan 31, 2019 (176) 0.10 5 5 92 G(0,0) Yes(72) 4.70 180
34 SPX Mar 15, 2019 (219) 0.10 5 5 89 G(0,0) Yes(147) 4.81 445
35 SPXW Mar 29, 2109 (233) 0.10 5 5 87 G(0,0) Yes(95) 4.90 234
36 SPX Jun 21, 2019 (317) 0.10 5 5 94 G(0,0) Yes(44) 5.20 126
37 SPXW Jun 21, 2019 (317) 0.10 5 5 94 G(0,0) Yes(32) 5.21 80
38 SPXW Jun 28, 2019 (324) 0.10 5 5 86 G(0,0) Yes(122) 5.28 301
39 SPX Sep 20, 2019 (408) 0.10 5 5 89 G(0,0) Yes(46) 5.50 125
40 SPX Dec 20, 2019 (499) 0.10 5 5 104 G(0,0) Yes(80) 6.02 493
41 SPX Jun 19, 2019 (681) 0.10 5 5 89 G(0,0) Yes(113) 5.92 353
42 SPX Dec 18, 2020 (863) 0.20 5 5 100 G(0,0) Yes(153) 7.09 911
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Table 8: Feb 7, 2018: Calendar arbitrage adjustments detail.
After(+): Market prices for PM options (asterisks) are adjusted upward.
After(-): Market prices for AM options (asterisks) are adjusted downward.
I. Before
File/ Expiration Put- Bid-Ask Convergence ERP Run
Root Date (days-to-go) BidMin N PG Nopts OutStats (steps) (κ = 3) time
17 SPX Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 G(0,0) Yes(77) 10.43 309
18 SPXW Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 A(1,0.01) Yes(217) 10.39 878
35 SPX Dec 21, 2018 (317) 0.05 4 5 105 A(1,0.05) No(250) 7.37 324
36 SPXW Dec 21, 2108 (317) 0.05 4 5 98 G(0,0) Yes(63) 7.36 76
II. After(+)
File/ Expiration Put- Bid-Ask Convergence ERP Run
Root Date (days-to-go) BidMin N PG Nopts OutStats (steps) (κ = 3) time
17 SPX Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 G(0,0) Yes(59) 10.42 251
18 SPXW∗ Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 A(1,0.01) Yes(52) 10.58 216
35 SPX Dec 21, 2018 (317) 0.15 4 5 97 G(0,0) Yes(71) 7.35 88
36 SPXW∗ Dec 21, 2108 (317) 0.15 4 5 97 G(0,0) Yes(85) 7.39 105
III. After(-)
File/ Expiration Put- Bid-Ask Convergence ERP Run
Root Date (days-to-go) BidMin N PG Nopts OutStats (steps) (κ = 3) time
17 SPX∗ Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 G(0,0) Yes(90) 10.20 350
18 SPXW Mar 16, 2018 (37) 0.05 4 5 259 A(1,0.01) Yes(217) 10.40 854
35 SPX∗ Dec 21, 2018 (317) 0.15 4 5 97 G(0,0) Yes(73) 7.32 75
36 SPXW Dec 21, 2108 (317) 0.15 4 5 97 G(0,0) Yes(85) 7.36 88
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Table 9: ERP sensitivity to cost-of-carry method: SPX options on Feb 7, 2018.
Rates (r, δ,ERP) shown as %/year. Forward = S0 exp((r − δ)T ), where S0 = 2706.48.
File/ T VIX white paper method PC-parity regression method Realized
Root (Years) r δ Forward ERP r δ Forward ERP δ
1 SPXW 0.00551 1.24 10.77 2705.06 26.34 5.69 14.75 2705.13 26.35 8.36
2 SPXW 0.01373 1.25 6.02 2704.71 16.21 2.91 7.03 2704.95 16.23 3.59
3 SPXW 0.01921 1.26 5.82 2704.11 16.16 5.44 9.55 2704.35 16.25 4.29
4 SPX 0.02394 1.27 5.16 2703.96 15.73 3.33 7.55 2703.73 15.75 4.69
5 SPXW 0.02469 1.27 5.64 2703.56 15.93 1.70 5.80 2703.74 15.92 4.69
6 SPXW 0.03565 1.28 3.59 2704.26 12.26 2.88 4.91 2704.53 12.30 3.45
7 SPXW 0.03838 1.29 3.19 2704.51 12.43 3.05 4.76 2704.70 12.43 3.25
8 SPXW 0.04386 1.30 2.75 2704.76 12.78 2.74 4.13 2704.84 12.79 3.18
9 SPXW 0.05208 1.31 2.78 2704.41 11.34 2.72 4.01 2704.67 11.41 2.92
10 SPXW 0.05756 1.32 2.71 2704.31 11.80 2.09 3.36 2704.50 11.82 3.07
11 SPXW 0.06304 1.32 2.86 2703.86 12.14 2.48 3.92 2704.02 12.16 3.20
12 SPXW 0.07126 1.34 2.51 2704.21 10.93 2.75 3.67 2704.72 10.94 2.84
13 SPXW 0.07674 1.34 2.36 2704.36 10.91 2.39 3.37 2704.44 10.94 2.80
14 SPXW 0.08222 1.35 2.35 2704.26 11.54 2.33 3.28 2704.37 11.56 2.97
15 SPXW 0.09044 1.36 2.21 2704.41 10.21 2.18 2.98 2704.52 10.24 2.71
16 SPXW 0.09592 1.37 2.36 2703.91 10.20 2.22 3.14 2704.11 10.21 2.91
17 SPX 0.10066 1.38 2.38 2703.76 10.43 2.41 3.27 2704.14 10.45 2.85
18 SPXW 0.10140 1.38 2.31 2703.91 10.39 2.35 3.25 2704.03 10.42 2.85
19 SPXW 0.12058 1.40 1.77 2705.26 10.01 2.33 2.64 2705.48 10.03 2.54
20 SPXW 0.13702 1.42 1.78 2705.16 9.55 2.31 2.61 2705.38 9.57 2.39
21 SPXW 0.15893 1.45 1.54 2706.06 8.93 2.30 2.36 2706.22 8.96 2.24
22 SPX 0.19655 1.49 1.46 2706.61 8.72 2.37 2.31 2706.80 8.75 2.15
23 SPXW 0.19729 1.49 1.46 2706.61 8.64 2.39 2.34 2706.74 8.67 2.15
24 SPXW 0.22469 1.52 1.33 2707.60 8.39 2.40 2.20 2707.70 8.42 1.94
25 SPX 0.27326 1.56 1.52 2706.80 8.52 2.43 2.38 2706.85 8.56 2.23
26 SPXW 0.27400 1.56 1.51 2706.90 8.50 2.46 2.41 2706.83 8.56 2.23
27 SPXW 0.30962 1.69 1.55 2706.84 8.25 2.30 2.21 2707.24 8.31 2.19
28 SPX 0.34997 1.62 1.55 2707.15 8.23 2.42 2.35 2707.20 8.28 2.20
29 SPXW 0.35071 1.62 1.55 2707.20 8.17 2.28 2.23 2706.91 8.21 2.20
30 SPXW 0.38907 1.65 1.45 2708.60 8.10 2.36 2.15 2708.69 8.15 2.08
31 SPXW 0.47674 1.70 1.34 2711.22 7.79 2.36 1.97 2711.54 7.87 1.94
32 SPX 0.61847 1.77 1.37 2713.13 7.56 2.44 2.06 2712.93 7.62 2.06
33 SPXW 0.61921 1.77 1.39 2712.88 7.53 2.37 1.98 2713.05 7.58 2.06
34 SPXW 0.63839 1.78 1.39 2713.13 7.52 2.36 1.97 2713.22 7.58 2.05
35 SPX 0.86778 1.86 1.36 2718.10 7.37 2.43 1.94 2718.11 7.46 2.05
36 SPXW 0.86852 1.86 1.34 2718.76 7.36 2.41 1.90 2718.68 7.43 2.05
37 SPXW 0.89592 1.86 1.26 2721.30 7.47 2.49 1.88 2721.31 7.54 2.04
38 SPX 0.94449 1.88 1.27 2722.01 7.25 2.51 1.90 2722.19 7.33 2.02
39 SPX 1.09792 1.92 1.33 2723.99 7.29 2.44 1.85 2724.18 7.37 2.07
40 SPX 1.36641 1.98 1.36 2729.63 7.28 2.44 1.80 2730.22 7.39 2.07
41 SPX 1.86504 2.10 1.40 2741.85 7.23 2.44 1.73 2742.68 7.29 NA
42 SPX 2.86230 2.29 1.44 2772.82 7.67 2.54 1.69 2772.77 7.78 NA
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Table 10: ERP sensitivity to cost-of-carry method: SPX options on Aug 8, 2018.
Rates (r, δ,ERP) shown as %/year. Forward = S0 exp((r − δ)T ), where S0 = 2861.59.
File/ T VIX white paper method PC-parity regression method
Root (Years) r δ Forward ERP r δ Forward ERP
1 SPXW 0.00551 1.85 7.63 2860.68 2.02 5.75 11.90 2860.62 2.01
2 SPXW 0.01373 1.86 3.67 2860.88 1.45 1.95 3.95 2860.80 1.45
3 SPXW 0.01921 1.86 4.06 2860.38 1.87 2.13 4.41 2860.34 1.87
4 SPX 0.02394 1.87 4.22 2859.98 2.06 2.66 4.98 2860.00 2.06
· · ·
39 SPX 1.11709 2.44 1.57 2889.55 5.50 2.85 1.97 2889.55 5.54
40 SPX 1.36641 2.50 1.57 2898.22 6.02 2.88 1.80 2898.19 5.83
41 SPX 1.86504 2.62 1.60 2916.26 5.92 3.01 1.99 2916.37 6.09
42 SPX 2.36367 2.71 1.66 2933.67 7.09 3.05 2.00 2934.01 7.00
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